Friendships Under Fire: The Durability of Interethnic Networks in Wartime

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Abstract

Can interethnic relationships forged in peacetime withstand the onslaught of civil war? Accounts of rescuing and assistance during the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide often cite such relationships, yet we lack reliable estimates of how frequently these pro-social behaviors occur and how often prewar connections are involved. To address these questions, and expand the scope of our understanding beyond these two cases, I examine the 1992-5 Bosnian War, conducting the first nationwide randomized survey on wartime rescuing and assistance in a post-conflict state. I find that interethnic assistance was widespread and more likely among Bosnians with more prewar interethnic ties. Yet surprisingly, assistance does not appear to be linked to emotionally strong ties any more than to weak ones. Despite the danger of being branded a traitor, Bosnians of all ethnicities appear to have been willing to help not only close friends but even friends-of-friends and acquaintances. Drawing on 160 new interviews, previously untapped census data on intermarriage rates, and oral histories collected during and after the violence, I develop a theory of how social networks facilitate intergroup cooperation in wartime. I conclude by exploring how these narratives of interethnic cooperation can be harnessed for reconciliation and reintegration in war's wake.

Keywords: Networks, Social Capital, Rescue, Genocide, Bosnia, Civil War

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1 Introduction

When a war breaks out in a multiethnic society, what happens to the social ties between members of the different ethnic groups? Although so-called "ethnic wars" are often perpetrated by only a small percentage of the population (Mueller 2000), even those who remain favorably disposed toward their outgroup neighbors may feel significant pressure to keep their heads down and break off contact. Those seen mingling with the other group may risk being labeled as traitors or spies, and physical barriers such as frontlines and roadblocks might prevent such mingling. Communities that have lived together harmoniously for decades may fall victim to ethnic security dilemmas on a local scale, in which defensive precautions and genocidal ambitions are difficult to distinguish (Posen 1993). One does not need to subscribe to the nationalist propaganda being blasted out over the airwaves to feel frightened when a neighboring village receives a shipment of arms or the outgroup members in one's own apartment building decide to organize a neighborhood watch. Once the violence begins, cycles of revenge take on a life of their own (Balcells 2017; Snyder 2004), severing longtime friendships and undermining social trust (De Luca and Verpoorten 2015). Even relationships that are not severed by war may lie dormant for its duration. For civilians and combatants alike, war is often a time of scarcity, making it difficult to provide for one's own needs and those of one's family, let alone those of a colleague or neighbor from a different ethnic group. Assistance to members of the outgroup, therefore, seems more likely to be the exception than the rule.

Nevertheless, I find that interethnic assistance was remarkably widespread during the 1992-5 Bosnian War, including in areas subject to ethnic cleansing. As I will show through newly collected survey data, about a quarter Bosnians gave or received help from a member of another ethnic group during the war. The ubiquity of these prosocial acts is supported by the frequency with which I came upon stories of rescue, protection, and aid during my fieldwork. However, opportunities for outgroup assistance at the time of the war were not evenly distributed. Had we a reliable way to subtract out the portion of the population that lacked such opportunities (e.g., those living in an ethnically homogeneous or peaceful area), the rate of assistance among the remaining population would necessarily be even higher.

Why was outgroup assistance in Bosnia so widespread? I argue that the frequency of cross-cleavage ties—friendship, kinship and acquaintanceship among neighbors, schoolmates, and colleagues—played a decisive role in motivating and enabling these wartime acts. Drawing on a nationwide door-to-door survey—the first to measure rates of assistance in a postwar state—I find that Bosnians with more outgroup contacts before the war had a greater probability of giving or receiving cross-group assistance once the violence began. Moreover, although one might expect emotionally strong ties–such as marriages–to be more likely to withstand the onslaught of war, I find that weak ties can be strangely enduring under fire. In my interviews,

and in those collected by other scholars, we find hundreds of instances of people receiving aid from friends they were not particularly close with or from strangers whom they were introduced to by a mutual friend. Help from complete strangers, however, appears to be rare, thus suggesting that social networks indeed played a crucial role. Many Bosnians, it seems, were willing to help someone they knew, even indirectly by helping someone they didn't know on that person's behalf.

To date, work on outgroup assistance has been focused primarily on rescuing in the Holocaust (e.g., Braun 2019; Finkel 2017; Gross 1994; Monroe 1996; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Paulsson 2002; Staub 1993; Tec 1986). Recent studies have begun to examine the Rwandan genocide as well (e.g., Brown 2014; Fox and Nyseth Brehm 2018; Fujii 2011; Luft 2015b; Sémelin et al. 2014), yet the scope remains confined to life-saving acts during genocide. This article extends this literature to civil wars and expands the scope to a wider variety of vital and non-vital assistance, including providing housing, food, or employment; transporting persecutees to safety; and protecting their property after they depart. By moving beyond genocide into contexts where the danger is not always lethal, a large array of previously overlooked helping behaviors burst into the spotlight. Furthermore, the proximity of friendly territory for minorities to flee to, in contrast to the Holocaust, and over a long duration, in contrast to the Rwandan genocide, greatly expands opportunities for assistance.

In addition to expanding the scope of the interdisciplinary genocide rescuer literature, this work makes three novel contributions to political science. First, I contribute to the civilian behavior and combatant behavior literature a broad new category which I term "cleavage-defying behaviors," acts which run contrary to the primary conflict cleavage. Such behaviors include joining an outgroup army (Kalyvas 2008; Lyall 2010; Staniland 2012a), defecting to the opposing side (McLauchlin 2015), and redefining oneself as a member of the outgroup (Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003). I expand this category by drawing attention to cases in which individuals maintain their own identity and side, but choose to provide assistance to those labeled as the enemy. Second, I contribute to the networks and conflict literature, arguing that networks not only harden group boundaries by mobilizing combatants (McDoom 2021; Shesterinina 2022) and their supporters (Parkinson 2013) but transcend them by mobilizing assistance across ethnic lines. While prior scholarship has demonstrated the power of networks to break down ethnic boundaries in peacetime (Wimmer 2013), we have only limited evidence to show this process is extant—let alone widespread—once violence begins. Finally, this study complements the recent blossoming of experimental work on intergroup contact theory in conflict settings (e.g., Mousa 2020; Scacco and Warren 2018). Rather than examining whether newly formed ties affect behavior, as interventions are well set up to do, this study traces the trajectory of longstanding, prewar ties into the violent period to determine whether their power to provide assistance fades or endures. Though such a design cannot make causal claims, it adds external validity to this valuable new work, suggesting that

the mechanisms they find hold relevance not only in post-conflict and low-level violent contexts, but also in an atmosphere of ongoing civil war, mass killing, and ethnic cleansing.

The rest of the study proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I demonstrate how a mixed-methods investigation of cross-group help during a civil war fills an important gap in the conflict literature. I then articulate my theory for how capacity, willingness, and networks together create cross-cleavage capital that can be activated in wartime for cross-group assistance. Section 3 presents the data sources and variables. In section 4, I present my quantitative results in section and expand on them with excerpts from my interviews. Section 5 concludes.

2 Networks, Intergroup Contact, and Social Capital

2.1 Networks under Fire

Much of the micro-level scholarship on civil conflict in recent years points to the importance of social networks in motivating civilian and combatant behavior (Gohdes 2015; Larson 2016; Lewis 2020; Marks 2019; Metternich et al. 2013; Perliger and Pedahzur 2011; Petersen 2001; Scacco 2008; Staniland 2012b; Weidmann 2015; Wood 2008; Zech and Gabbay 2016). When it comes to group-targeted violence, their findings are largely pessimistic. McDoom (2014a) finds that Rwandans with more friends were more likely to commit murder during the Rwandan genocide. Balcells (2017) and Kalyvas (2006) show that interpersonal ties carry not only friendship but also rivalry and grievance, leading to betrayal and revenge under the cover of war. At the community level, Larson and Lewis (2017) find that a handful of ties between two ethnic groups in a village can actually reduce cooperation and disrupt intergroup peace. Thus, there is ample reason to suppose that networks harm rather than help persecutees during episodes of identity-targeted violence.

However, harm and help are not mutually exclusive. In the words of one Bosnian Muslim man I interviewed, there were combatants in Bosnia "...who maybe went to the point of being war criminals but were very good to their neighborhood." Much of the literature on the Holocaust and Rwandan genocide suggests that networks may play a palliative role in group-targeted violence, even if they fail to stem the bloodshed. In a decade-long study of nearly 1000 Holocaust rescuers, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that rescuers were twice as likely as non-rescuers to have Jewish friends before the war. In a statistical analysis of the fates of 7665 Jews randomly selected from a Nazi registry in Amsterdam, Tammes (2007) concludes, "Survival correlates most strongly with having close social ties with non-Jews." Finkel (2017) finds that Jews living in cities that had been more integrated before WWII were more likely to turn to Christian contacts for help—and ultimately met with greater success—while Jews in highly segregated cities relied on fellow

Jews in positions of limited authority whose power to protect proved ephemeral. Braun (2019) finds that Dutch Jews living near a minority denomination church were more likely to survive, which he attributes both to cross-cleavage ties between Jews and their Christian-minority neighbors and dense networks of ingroup ties within these minority church communities that facilitated collective action. Thus, even in places where local outgroup civilians were willing to join in the persecution, networks can simultaneously contribute to assistance, as Fujii (2011) artfully demonstrates in an ethnographic study of two communities in Rwanda. Thus, we have good reason to expect that networks will prove instrumental in facilitating cross-group assistance in wartime, even if they also produce violence.

2.2 Intergroup Contact and the Importance of Cross-Cleavage Ties

Why might networks be important? Beginning with Allport's (1954) seminal book *The Nature of Prejudice* and earlier papers by Williams Jr. (1947) and Smith (1943), an extensive social science literature suggests that intergroup contact can reduce discrimination and prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). In a recent meta-review, however, Paluck et al. (2019), reveal that very little of this research has focused on racial and ethnic divisions among adults, the dimension of intergroup contact most directly relevant to civil wars and contentious politics. They point out that Allport's original conditions for intergroup contact to be productive—close cooperation between the groups, common goals, equal status within the space of interaction, and support for authorities, institutions, or customs—may still be essential, despite earlier studies' attempts to discard them. In other words, in order for intergroup contact to lead to positive outcomes, the quality of the interactions matters.

Indeed, close contact between identity groups is neither inherently prosocial nor antagonistic; encounters with outgroup members can break down or reinforce stereotypes, foster understanding and empathy or generate rivalry and competition. Kopstein and Wittenberg (2011) find that Poles were more likely to participate in the murders of Jews during WWII in areas where Jews and Poles had been more politically polarized during the interwar period, with less killing in areas where the state had more successfully integrated the two communities. Likewise, Balcells (2017) argues that left-learning and right-leaning neighbors were more likely to betray each other in the Spanish civil war in towns where prewar political rivalries had been most intense, and McDoom (2014b) finds that the onset of violence was delayed in parts of Rwanda where Tutsis and Hutus were more socially integrated. That said, although more social integration and cooperation between groups may reduce or delay locally driven violence, it will not necessarily reduce the total number of fatalities. External actors such as genocidal militias may deliberately target areas of high cooperation if they see these areas as an ideological threat to their goals of ethnic purity. Furthermore, in ethnic conflicts,

external actors may not need to rely on local informants in order to determine which citizens are members of the outgroup; skin tone, facial features, dress, language, accent, or—in Bosnia's case—name and neighborhood may be sufficient to mark one for death. Assistance, on the other hand, is an overwhelmingly local phenomenon. Thus, we should expect an even stronger relationship between meaningful intergroup contact and assistance than we see between intergroup contact and causalities.

I maintain that cross-group social networks, as opposed to mere geographic mixing of identity groups, present clear evidence of Allport's sort of intergroup contact in action. Yugoslavia, which Bosnia was part of until the outbreak of the 1992 war, promoted common goals, equal status, and close cooperation between the state's three major ethnoreligious groups (Muslims, Serbs, and Croats),[1] underscored by its slogan "Brotherhood and Unity" (Woodward 1995). The result was widespread friendship and intermarriage, as I show descriptively based on survey and census data in Appendix C, echoing the prior literature (e.g., Gagnon 2004; Mueller 2000; Smits 2010). What remains to be shown is whether intergroup contact, even under ideal conditions, will be sufficient to promote assistance once fighting begins. Bergholz (2016) and Balcells (2017) suggest that once fighting gets underway, endogenous cycles of revenge may take hold. Fujii (2011) argues that Rwandan Hutus became involved in killing their neighbors as their prewar social ties were supplanted by new ones generated through the conflict, echoing Wood (2008)'s demonstration of how social networks can be transformed in wartime. Straus (2014) goes a step further, showing that Hutus who initially tried to protect Tutsi neighbors eventually turned to persecuting them as the danger of defying the social pressure became too great. I hypothesize, therefore, that while we should expect to see widespread assistance in Bosnia due to its high levels of Allportian social contact prewar, we should expect riskier forms of assistance to be less frequent.

2.3 Cross-Cleavage Capital

Moving from the societal to the individual level, what sorts of individuals should be most likely to engage in assistance? The genocide rescuer literature identifies a myriad of causal factors leading to cross-group assistance, which I group into three categories: capacity, willingness, and networks. First, Gushee (1993) and Bjørnskov (2015) cite biographical factors such as assets, abilities, and social status which affect an individual's *capacity* to provide assistance. As McAdam (1986) discusses in his study of White civil rights workers during the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign in Mississippi, individuals who had fewer personal constraints on their time and responsibilities were more likely to risk their lives to secure voting rights for a racial outgroup. Second, Holocaust scholars such as Fogelman (2011), Fagin-Jones and Midlarsky (2007),

[1] I use these names throughout this study, because they are terms most often preferred by my interviewees. In Bosnia, Croats and Serbs are sometimes referred to by their nominal confessions—Catholic and Orthodox respectively—even though some of their members were entirely irreligious. Bosnian Muslims later adopted an ethnonym—Bosniaks—during the war.

and Monroe et al. (1990) emphasize how individuals' *willingness* to risk their lives to save others stems from personality and attitudinal traits including a universalist worldview, kindness, or bravery. Tec (1986), for instance, examines how individuals' religiosity affected how willing they were to shelter Jews. Finally, multiple genocide scholars emphasize the importance of both helpers' and recipients' social ties (e.g., Fox and Nyseth Brehm 2018; Luft 2015a; Paulsson 2002; Tec 1986).

To integrate these three sets of causes into a comprehensive framework, I propose a theory of cross-cleavage capital. I define an individual's *social capital* as one's ability to get help from others.[2] To make the definition concrete, let us consider a woman attempting to borrow a lawnmower and the factors that might affect her success. First, how many neighbors does she know well enough to ask for such a favor? This aspect of social capital is determined by the woman's position in the neighborhood social network and is largely a function of her *degree* (number of ties).[3] Second, how many of her neighbors own lawnmowers? This aspect of social capital reflects the capacity of others in her community to provide the assistance she seeks. Third, are any of them willing to share their lawnmowers? The answer is shaped by each neighbor's baseline generosity, the danger or cost involved (presumably minimal in this context), and the convenience (e.g., are they in the right place and at the right time). It may also be influenced by *tie strength*—the strength of the relationship between the woman and the neighbor she is asking.

Despite its ability to bring people together and enhance their access to emotional support, goods, and services, social capital can have extremely deleterious effects. For instance, Berman (1997), McDoom (2014a), and Satyanath et al. (2017) document how social capital can lead people to support genocidal regimes or even join in the killing. Putnam (2000) draws a distinction between the "bonding" and "bridging" dimensions of social capital: the former creates deep bonding within a clique or social circle, the latter bridges the gaps between these clusters. Often these social circles are ethnically homogeneous, as Putnam points out, and thus we might think of the bridging dimension as the most relevant to getting help from an outgroup during a war. However, in a highly integrated community with diverse neighborhoods, workplaces, and groups of friends, ties that are bridging in an ethnic sense need not be bridging in a structural sense, nor vice versa. Instead, I coin the term *cross-cleavage capital* to specify one's ability to muster assistance across a prominent social cleavage and not necessarily from outside one's social clique. The definition, therefore, depends on the social context and not just the network. In this study, the relevant cleavage is the division

[2]Other definitions of social capital focus on the community level, incorporating cultural norms, trust, and civil society organizations (e.g. Coleman 1988; Lin 1999; Putnam 2000). While these variables are also likely to influence the frequency of assistance, the present study focuses on variation at the individual level, holding community-level social capital constant.

[3]And perhaps the degrees of neighbors as well, in case they are willing to ask someone else on her behalf. Beyond that radius, additional information about the wider network is unlikely to have much relevance. News, rumors, and notice of opportunities often travel multiple steps through a network, but in most cultures, it seems unlikely that one would borrow a lawnmower from the friend of a friend of a friend. This limitation is all the more relevant for wartime assistance, when danger and trust come into play. Thus, degree seems the most appropriate measure of network centrality in this context.

between Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. In societies with multiple cross-cutting cleavages, one could have high cross-cleavage capital with respect to one cleavage (e.g., political party) and low cross-cleavage capital with respect to another (e.g., sexual orientation).

For a person facing persecution based on their ethnicity, higher cross-cleavage capital is clearly a good thing. If we think of cross-cleavage capital as a series of obligations or promissory notes from before war, the empirical question is whether those debts will still be honored in light of new dangers and hostilities. For potential helpers, the connection may seem less obvious. It is their own capacity and willingness, not that of their outgroup friends, that will determine their likelihood of lending a hand. However, for both helpers and recipients, the ties are important. All else being equal, a persecutee with more cross-cleavage ties stands a greater chance of being saved, while a potential helper with more cross-cleavage ties will likely have more opportunities to step in.

> **Hypothesis 1**: The more cross-cleavage ties an individual has prewar, the more likely they will be to give or receive assistance.

Does the quality of those ties matter as well? In the presence of great danger, cost, inconvenience, or ingroup pressure, we might expect a would-be helper may limit their help to those they feel closest to. An individual in need of help, meanwhile, may not feel comfortable putting their life in someone's hands unless they already have a high level of trust. Furthermore, the emotional depth of a relationship is likely to be correlated with the frequency of interaction, and those who interact more often are more likely to find one another in the right place at the right time.

> **Hypothesis 2:** The number of *strong* cross-cleavage ties an individual has prewar will have a greater impact on their likelihood of giving or receiving assistance than the number of weak ones.

A positive relationship between tie strength and assistance is by no means guaranteed. While strong ties might influence an outgroup member's willingness to provide assistance, they may be negatively correlated with capacity. Varshney (2003) finds that formal, institutional ties between Hindu and Muslim local leaders prove more robust in times of religious tension and crises than the informal friendships and quotidian ties we might naturally expect to be more emotionally strong or meaningful. Granovetter (1973) suggests that alters with weak ties may be more effective than those with strong ties at helping people find jobs, because weak ties are more likely to be bridging different social clusters and thus provide job-seekers access to fresh information about jobs they are not already aware of. It also possible that tie strength may matter more for people seeking assistance than for those providing it. A persecutee who approaches a member of the dominant group for help may be uncertain if this person will persecute them unless they have a sufficiently

strong tie. A helper, on the other hand, is unlikely to be betrayed by the person they are helping and thus may not need to worry as much about trust (unless they recruit other helpers). This study thus contributes to long-standing literature on when and where tie strength matters in contentious politics (e.g., McAdam and Paulsen 1993).

2.4 Scope Conditions and Case Selection

One of the primary aims of this study is to expand the scope of the genocide rescuer literature, not only to non-lifesaving forms of assistance, but to new contexts. My theory of cross-cleavage capital implies the existence of two or more groups, but it does not specify what types of groups they must be. For there to be a clear ingroup and outgroup, residents of a local community must have a shared conception of who is a member and who is not, whether that distinction is based on religion, sect, ethnicity, race, class, language, region, or something else entirely. These identities may, at times, be fluid, but once the violence begins, they must be sufficiently "sticky" that persecuted individuals cannot easily shed them. Ideological identities can become as hard to escape as ethnic ones, as Balcells (2017) makes clear in her examination of rivalry and revenge during the Spanish Civil War. The theory of cross-cleavage capital does not require the individuals to be socialized into separate clusters. Therefore, it is sufficiently flexible so as to not require a deep societal cleavage before the conflict begins. All that matters is for individuals to be targeted based on a hard-to-remove identity and for there to be ties between members of the two groups. The violence itself can take the form of a riot or pogrom, civil war, identity-based state repression, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Purely interstate wars with domestic armed opposition generally fall outside the scope of this theory due to the lack of ties between groups living in different areas, but there are exceptions. Within domestic conflicts, the theory would be inapplicable in regions where the entire population is being targeted and there are not local members of the dominant group to provide assistance.

The 1992-5 conflict in Bosnia & Herzegovina provides fertile ground in which to test this theory. The conflict was organized along ethnoreligious lines, yet the three groups—Muslims, Croats, and Serbs—had a high rate of intermarriage and mixed neighborhoods before the war. The four years of violence featured widespread territorial cleansing, massacres, and an act of genocide in which civilians were targeted en masse based on their group identity. Thus, this is the sort of place where my theory would predict cross-group assistance. At the same time, however, this conflict provides widespread subnational variation, allowing me to test both the validity and scope of the model. Rates of intermarriage, a good proxy for cross-group network integration, varied widely by municipality, as did rates of mixed neighborhoods and non-private apartments. Conflict type also varied widely. Some areas like Vitez and Mostar saw back-and-forth contestation of

territory between two armies engaged in trench warfare. Others like Prijedor and Bijeljina were dominated by one-sided violence including massacres and ethnic cleansing (Burg and Shoup 1999). Sarajevo experienced a siege, Srebrenica an act of genocide, and Banja Luka a crackdown on Muslims that resembles non-cleansing repression of a minority by an authoritarian state (Maass 1996). Thus, my findings should be applicable in a wide variety of contexts where group-targeted violence is widespread but falls short of mass killing in all but a handful of locales.

3 Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, I undertook what to the best of my knowledge is the first survey to systematically measure the frequency of wartime assistance in a postwar state. From December 2021 to June 2022, I fielded a nationwide door-to-door survey of 3501 Bosnian war survivors through Prism Research and Consulting, a well-regarded local survey firm with a long track record of academic research, including the World Values Survey. The firm randomly chose sampling points using the population distribution from the 2013 census stratified by region and rurality. Trained survey enumerators were deployed to these locations and selected households to sample accorded using a random walk procedure. To be eligible respondents had to be born before 1981 and living in Bosnia in early 1992, on the eve of the war. I chose this age cutoff to ensure the respondents would be likely to have clear memories of the war and any help their family received, even if they were too young at the time to provide assistance to others.

Recruitment and consent took place in three stages. First, the resident who opened the door was asked if they would participate in a survey about "friends and neighbors in Bosnia," specifically "what these relations were like in the time of Yugoslavia and how they have changed." After listing all eligible household members, the enumerator selected the individual with the most recent birthday (a common randomization method) and read the consent script. If the respondent consented, the enumerator began the survey, the first half of which contained no questions about the war. For sections with more sensitive or repetitive questions, the enumerator would pass the tablet computer to the respondent to fill out themselves, unless they requested assistance. Finally, upon reaching the war-related modules, the enumerator informed the respondent that the next section pertained to the war and asked if it was okay to proceed. Overall, enumerators were successful in obtaining an interview at 66% of randomly sampled households, which Prism Research reports is comparable to response rates it achieves in door-to-door surveys on non-sensitive topics. Of those, 73% completed the full survey including the war-related modules (see Appendix C for details).

Name	Close Friend/Relative	Friend/Relative	Acquaintance	Nobody
Aleksandr	X			
Anamarija		X		
Alija				X
Branislav				X
Darko		X		
Dušan			X	
Elvis	X			
Emina				X

Figure 1: An example of an identity roster filled out by a respondent. Each name is associated with a particular ethnic group.

3.1 Measuring Social Networks

Measuring network diversity 30 years after the fact in a postconflict state presents multiple challenges. To mitigate potential biases, I opted to include three types of network questions: an identity roster, name generators, and position generators. Below, I explain each type of question and then discuss their tradeoffs.

Identity Roster In order to measure the overall diversity of respondents' prewar networks, including both strong and weak ties, I developed a new network battery which I call an "identity roster." In Bosnia, as in many countries, first names are often indicative of a respondent's identity group due to their religious origins. Even among secular families, such names remained popular throughout the Yugoslav period. Drawing on the Bosnian Statistical Agency's name frequency database, I selected 30 common names whose ethnic affiliation my translators and survey firm judged to be reasonably unambiguous. Respondents were presented with these names in random order and asked whether they "knew anyone with that name in the Yugoslavia era, and if so, how close you were to them. By knowing someone, I mean you both knew each others' names and would say hello upon seeing each other in those days." To measure the strength of these ties, respondents were asked to check off whether the person(s) they knew by each name were acquaintances, friends or family, or close friends or family. Multiple categories were permitted. See Figure 1 for an example of how an identity roster might look when filled out.

Name Generator A name generator battery asks respondents to provide the names of contacts and then gathers additional details about each one. In my interviews, many respondents mentioned their next-door neighbors playing an important role in their lives and recalled popping into each others' apartment or houses

for coffee on a regular basis. Therefore, I asked respondents to provide the names of their three closest neighbors (in order of proximity) and how often they came over for coffee as a measure of tie strength. I also asked the names of their two closest friends. Although one could try to infer ethnicity from the names themselves, many names are ambiguous.[4] Therefore, later in the survey, once the topic of ethnicity had finally been broached, I circled back to each of these names to ask their ethnicities.

Position Generator A position generator asks a respondent for details about the individuals filling particular roles in their life (spouse, boss, confidant, etc.) without necessarily providing a name. I asked respondents the ethnicity of their godfather or godmother (a common institution across all three religions), and if they were married before the war, the ethnicity of their spouse and the best man and best woman at their wedding. These questions were placed later in the survey once ethnicity was already being discussed.

Tradeoffs between Types of Network Measures The measurement of prewar networks faces three major challenges: What respondents can recall (recall bias), what they think the interviewer wants to hear (demand effects), and what their society considers acceptable or desirable (social desirability bias). The position generator is undoubtedly the most robust to recall bias (respondents are unlikely to forget the ethnicity of a spouse or godmother). My qualitative interviews suggest that respondents were also likely to remember the names and ethnicities of their closest neighbors and friends. The identity roster is less reliable in this regard, as it is easy to forget acquaintances or medium-strength friendships. What matters for this study, however, is not overall recall of weak-to-medium ties but whether respondents can recall ingroup ties better than outgroup ties. Given that the war resulted in extreme geographic sorting by ethnicity, many respondents are probably more likely to have maintained contact with weak ties from their own group in the years after the war, making their names easier to recall. While I cannot eliminate this bias entirely, I address this concern with a robustness check that controls for present-day intergroup contact.

Despite its vulnerability to recall bias, the identity roster is likely the most robust type of question in the face of demand effects. Respondents were never actually asked the ethnicity of the people named, and the names were intermingled to avoid the giving the impression that ethnicity was the object of study. The name and position generators are more vulnerable here, since I ask about ethnicity explicitly. Nevertheless, while a respondent might be tempted to exaggerate or downplay the diversity of their friendships, to do so on these questions would require lying about particular individuals whose name they have already provided.

Finally, all three questions are vulnerable to social desirability bias if the respondent fears that they might be harshly judged by their enumerator (frequently a co-ethnic) for being a traitor to their group. A

[4] I avoided such names in the identity roster.

Croat whose best friend was named Fatima, a name which clearly signals that this friend is Muslim, might skip over Fatima and list her second and third closest friends instead. She could also decline to answer the ethnicity questions for name or position generators, claiming to not remember. Even on the identity roster, when she comes to the name Fatima, she might decide to downplay the friendship by checking the box for regular friend or acquaintance. My primary safeguard against social desirability bias in all three cases was to have the respondent fill out these modules themselves on the tablet, clicking "next" before handing the tablet back to the enumerator. From a regression standpoint, this bias only becomes problematic if respondents who fear social sanction are systematically more (or less) likely to have engaged in cross-group assistance during the war. I address this concern through a robustness check controlling for whether the respondent believes their community today disapproves of cross-group ties.

On the whole, while no social network question is robust to every type of bias, obtaining similar results across different types questions with different strengths can go a long way toward validating one's findings.

3.2 Outcome Variables

Based on my qualitative interviews, I created a list of nine types of assistance. The intro text to this battery read, "Here are 9 different ways people can help each other during war. Please tell us if you helped someone in this way or if someone helped you (or your household) in this way. We are only interested in the help of individuals, not organizations or governments."

1. Distributed food, money or supplies
2. Protected someone's home or property while they were gone
3. Warned someone that people were coming to arrest or attack them
4. Helped someone get medical care during the war
5. Helped someone obtain documents (passport, diploma, birth certificate, etc.)
6. Provided someone with a place to live for more than a month
7. Hid or protected someone from people who wanted to arrest or kill them
8. Helped someone escape danger (e.g., crossing a checkpoint or front line, leaving a camp or prison)
9. Stopped armed men who were in the process of arresting or attacking someone

For each assistance type, respondents were asked to check whether a) I did this for someone else, b) Someone else did it for my household, c) both, or d) neither.

The unit of analysis for helpers is the individual while for recipients it is the household. During my qualitative interviews, I realized that most forms of assistance benefited an entire household. For instance, saving a mother from arrest or giving a father a work permit naturally helps their spouse and children. On the other hand, helpers could, and often did, act alone. The main drawback to this approach is while we can estimate the percentage of households in which someone was rescued from an attack or arrest, we cannot say what percentage of the population was rescued in this way.

For my regressions, I group these help types into three categories: *rescue* (types 3, 7, 8, 9), *provisions* (type 1), and *personal help* (everything else). The *rescue* variable is meant to capture individuals whom we often think as rescuers in the context of the Holocaust. In each of its four help types—warning of an attack, hiding someone, helping someone escape, or intervening in an arrest/attack—the helper saves a potential victim from persecution or violence. I set aside *provisions* as its own category because it is the most likely to be impersonal. Many respondents in my interviews, particularly those in Sarajevo apartment buildings, reported that all the neighbors shared food with one another. Distributing food in this way may tell us something about the character of the helper (or the culture of the neighborhood), but it says little about their relationship with each individual recipient.[5] The third category, *personal help*, consists of acts that may not have been live-saving, but are inherently dyadic. Protecting property, obtaining personal documents, and providing a place to live are acts done deliberately for particular individual(s) or household(s), not the entire neighborhood. "Helped someone get medical care" is perhaps the most ambiguous type of help, since it potentially includes both a woman obtaining insulin for her diabetic neighbor and an ambulance driver transporting an anonymous victim to the hospital. However, since most respondents were not medical professionals and since civilian medical needs stem from many causes other than violence, the *personal help* category seems like the best fit for this help type.

Each time a respondent indicated giving or receiving a certain form of help, a follow-up question appeared asking "How close were you all before this happened?" with response options a) one of my closest friends/relatives, b) friend/relative, c) acquaintance, d) friend-of-a-friend I hadn't met before, e) total stranger, or f) not sure. They were asked also the ethnicity of the helper/recipient (multiple answers were permitted, as there may have been multiple helpers or recipients). The help battery thus captures both in-group and cross-group assistance, distinguishing between the two only after the respondent has indicated the help took place.

I structured the questions in this way to try to tamp down demand effects. A respondent might reasonably conclude that the researcher wants to hear that she helped someone but ethnicity of the recipient is presented as a matter of secondary interest, once the type of help, direction of help, and relationship

[5]It may also be one of the easiest forms of help to misremember or exaggerate.

have already been asked about. In the analysis that follows, however, the outcome variable only records cross-ethnic assistance unless noted. Cases of ingroup assistance, no assistance, or where one of the parties was neither a Muslim, Serb, nor Croat (or their ethnicity was unknown) are coded as 0.

My primary regression outcomes are *provided help* and *received help*, which are coded as 1 if a respondent provided (or received) any form of assistance. I also created "gave" and "received" variables for the three help categories (*provided rescue*, *received rescue*, etc.). Additional results, mostly descriptive, draw on a battery of follow-up questions about a single case of assistance the respondent was involved in.[6] After establishing when in the war the act took place, I probed for further details about the other party (their gender, ethnicity, soldier or civilian status), relationship between helper and recipient (strangers, schoolmates, army comrades, etc.), helper resources (access to information, connections, leadership position), secondary helpers and intermediaries, potential reciprocity (whether the recipient had done an important favor for the helper before the war), and the level of danger involved. All questions about wartime assistance were completed by the respondents on the tablet without the enumerator seeing their answers.

3.3 Control Variables

Although the war eventually touched nearly every part of Bosnia, demand for cross-group assistance was not evenly distributed. Some municipalities experienced mass expulsions and massacres, others saw more targeted authoritarian-style persecution of individual outgroup members, while still others saw little victimization or were nearly monoethnic to begin with. In my main models, I account for this variation with municipality-level fixed effects. In the robustness checks, however, I instead include enumerator fixed effects (to control for the influence different survey enumerators may have had on responses) and add several municipality-level controls. First, I control for each group's population in a municipality's population based on the 1991 census as a rough proxy for the number of non-coethnics who could potentially help (supply) or be helped (demand). Second, I include the number of civilians killed in each municipality as a proxy for the level of victimization, and hence demand for assistance, based on *The Bosnian Book of the Dead* (Tokača 2012). This variable may also help control for the level of danger a potential helper faced, and the types of assistance (e.g., hiding someone for a day versus smuggling them across the frontlines) that would have been feasible. Finally, I control for the vote share received by non-ethnic parties in the 1990 municipal elections to proxy for the amount of intergroup rivalry and nationalism prior to the war, a potential driver for both demand and supply.

To account for demand at the individual level, I ask respondents whether they needed food, medical

[6]The case selected was always the last one in the list that the respondent gave or received. I ordered the list according to how frequent I expected each type of help to be, so that the follow-up battery would oversample rare types of assistance that I would otherwise get very little data on.

care, or documents during the war. I sum responses to create a *demand* index (0-3). I also ask respondents which army controlled the area they lived in at the start of the war and match these responses to their own ethnicity to create the *territory* variable (optional are ingroup, outgroup, or unknown).[7] I also ask respondents whether they *fled* their homes at some point during the war.. Finally, I asked respondents if they faced *threats* because of their ethnicity or religion. These demand-side controls are useful not only for modeling who received help, but for modeling who provided help as well, since people facing persecution or deprivation themselves are less likely to be in a position to provide assistance.

Age can affect a person's capacity to assist and their likelihood of attracting help from others, though the trends may be nonlinear. Children may not yet have had much opportunity to forge cross-cleavage ties, especially if they grew up in a monoethnic village, and generally have less capacity to help. However, when it comes to receiving help, they may be more likely to arouse the sympathy of outgroup members. Young adults may be more able to provide help, but young men may have a harder time receiving it if outgroup members perceive them as a threat. Older adults, like children, often have less capacity to provide assistance. I therefore divide *age* into four brackets: 12-17, 18-29, 30-49, and 50-69 (due to the passage of time, there were no respondents who were older than this in 1992).

To account for economic circumstances, I asked respondents about their *finances* prior to war (comfortable, difficult, or in between). Wealthier respondents may have been less likely to need, or able to provide, assistance, though it's less clear what we should expect the relationship between economic status and cross-cleavages ties to be.[8] Gender, marital status, and having children are likely to affect people's network connections, capacity to assist, and sympathy from potential helpers. I include *female* and *married* as dummies, and household size as a continuous variable. The latter is also important because receiving assistance is measured at the household level. I also include dummies for the main ethnic groups, with Muslims as the reference category.

Finally, willingness to form cross-cleavage ties and to provide assistance may be influenced by personality and upbringing. I assess the former using the BFI-2-S, the shortened version of the Big Five Personality Inventory that measures individuals along five personality dimensions (Soto and John 2017). I also ask respondents about how likely they were to pursue risky or thrill-seeking behaviors prior to the war to create a *risk tolerance* variable. To address upbringing, I ask how important *Yugoslav* identity was to the respondent's parents (not important, somewhat important, very important).[9]. I expect families emphasizing this

[7] Although the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was multiethnic, I code it as outgroup for Croats and Serbs since its soldiers and commanders were overwhelmingly Muslims.

[8] In the robustness checks in Appendix E, I instead include two economic variables directly related to assistance: whether someone in the respondent's household owned a *car* or a weekend/summer *cottage*, both of which were fairly common in Yugoslav times and could be used for transport or shelter. It may also be easier for a respondent to accurately remember, especially if they were a child at the start of the war.

[9] In the robustness checks, I instead use a question about family's (*religiosity*)

pan-ethnic identity to have had more cross-cleavage relationships and encourage their children to engage in cooperation with other groups. I also ask whether intermarriage was tolerated in their community (*exogamy acceptance)* and whether the stories told about World War II (if any) portrayed members of different ethnic groups helping or betraying one another (*WWII helping*).

3.4 Models

The main models discussed in this article use linear regression with municipality fixed effects, as specified in the preregistration. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Alternative models replace these fixed effects with enumerator fixed effect and instead include controls for each municipality's pre-war ethnic composition, wartime fatalities, and population. Additional models use logistic regression, ridge/LASSO regression, and Bayesian hierarchical models (see Appendix E).

3.5 Interviews

Over the course of 10 months, I conducted over 160 interviews with individuals who had lived in Bosnia during the war. The war is still a sensitive topic in Bosnia, and many Bosnians are weary of talking about it, wary of discussing it with a stranger, or worried about the consequences of coethnics finding out they helped "the enemy." To overcome these obstacles, I worked with six different research assistants representing all three of Bosnia's major ethnic groups who tapped into their own social networks to find potential interviewees. A typical interviewee, for instance, might by my research assistant's mother's former coworker. We also used snowball sampling, asking interviewees if there were other people they could put us in touch with. Finally, we obtained a handful of interviews by approaching individuals on the street, in taxis, shops, or other workplaces. See Appendix A for details on procedures. My identity as a non-coethnic, an American, and a young man inevitably shaped which people were willing to talk to me and how they presented their stories. So too did the identities of my research assistants and their positions in the country's social network. To gain a wider perspective, therefore, I triangulate these interviews with two local sources: Broz (2004), an anthology of stories of assistance collected by a Yugoslav doctor during and shortly after the war, and RDC (2010), a collection of testimonies complied by the Sarajevo-based Research & Documentation Center.



Figure 2: Frequency of giving or receiving assistance with 95% confidence intervals.

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive Results

Just how common was cross-group assistance? As shown in Figure 2, 25% of respondents reported having given or received cross-ethnic assistance. Breaking down assistance by type, we see assistance becomes more rare as the type of assistance becomes more risky (e.g., intervened in an attack) or requires special skills or connections (e.g., obtained documents). Figure 2 splits these statistics into assistance given or received, grouping the nine help types into three categories discussed in section 3.2: provisions, personal help, and rescue. Here we again see that among both helper recipients, more difficult forms of assistance are rarer, with the provisions (second bar) more prevalent than all other forms of help combined (third bar). However, even if we were consider a stricter definition of assistance that excluded provisions and included only personal help and rescue, we still find 13% of respondents gave assistance and 6% received it. Given that helping is more prevalent than receiving it in every category. This gap could be due to exaggerations by supposed helpers, but given the general hostility in Bosnia today towards interethnic cooperation, I suspect there was more under-reporting than over-reporting of help-giving. A more plausible explanation is that persecuted people from all ethnic groups were more likely to emigrate and not return, leaving fewer recipients than helpers in the population.[10]

[10] Also, as noted above, it is difficult to assess what the true ratio of helpers to recipients ought to be, since one can give or receive help from multiple people and the recipient question asked about anyone *in your household*.



Figure 3: Frequency of giving and receiving assistance with 95% confidence intervals (N=2548). Note that respondents could list multiple types of help and that some both gave and received assistance.

Does such widespread assistance seem credible in light of other evidence? Anecdotally, I can say that over my 10 months of fieldwork, I frequently came upon stories of cross-ethnic help when I wasn't even looking for them. The Alamo agent I rented a car from, my first landlady, a staff member at the survey firm, and a professor I met at a coffeehouse all volunteered stories about themselves or a relative who had been rescued upon hearing what I was there to research. My research assistants, too, seemed to have little trouble finding helpers and recipients for me to interview through their social networks. One of them uncovered multiple incidents of assistance while field testing survey questions among older neighbors in her apartment building. And while many of our interviewees were people whom a prior contact told us had a story to share, we also came upon helpers and recipients serendipitously in the course of our travels.

Local authors also report an abundance of helping. Svetlana Broz, a Belgrade-born cardiologist and granddaughter of Yugoslav president Josep Broz Tito, began hearing stories of cross-ethnic assistance from her patients while running a free clinic in Bosnia during the first year of the war. There in the Drina valley, the site sof ome of the war's most notorious massacres and widespread ethnic cleansing, Broz was so struck by the prevalence of these stories that she began collecting them for an anthology *Good People in an Evil Time* (Broz 2004).[11] Around the same time, a team of local and international human rights advocates and scholars began collecting stories about displacement sent in by refugees, later published as *The Suitcase: Refugee Voices from Bosnia and Croatia* (Mertus et al. 1997). Unlike Broz (2004), helping is not the focus of these stories, yet anecdotes of cross-ethnic assistance crop up throughout the section on how refugees succeeded in

[11]These stories, in fact, led Broz to found an organization dedicated to promoting and recognizing acts of civic courage and coexistence.

fleeing the conflict zone. Over the following 15 years, the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo managed to collect over a hundred stories of assistance for their own anthology. A finally, master's student Nevena Medić, a native of Srebrenica, managed to interview nearly a dozen helpers and recipients during a two-week site visit, as well as others who did not want to be interviewed (Medić 2016). All told, these authors' experiences and my own lend credence to the findings of my survey. While not necessarily prevalent in every region, cross-ethnic assistance appears to have been a widespread phenomenon.

4.2 Cross-Cleavage Tie Frequency and Assistance

Table 1 provides substantial support for H1. These models describe the relationship between a respondent's cross-cleavage ties, as measured by *outgroup names* checked off in the identity roster, and the probability of giving assistance to a member of the outgroup. Model 1 includes all types of assistance, while subsequent models focus on the categories described in section 3.2. In model 1, we see that each additional outgroup name is associated with a 0.01 increase in the probability of giving assistance ($p < 0.01$). This finding holds when we home in *provisions* or *personal help*. It is weaker, though still significant, for *rescue*. All finding robust to alternative fixed effects and controls (see Online Appendix E).

The relationship is substantively, as well as statistically, significant. Applying average marginal effects to model 1, I find that a one standard deviation increase in the number of outgroup names corresponds to 6.0 percentage point increase in the probability of providing assistance. Individuals who checked off two outgroup names (the 25th percentile) had a 17.6% chance of providing outgroup assistance, while those who checked off nine outgroup names (the 75th percentile), had a 25.6% chance. Note that a single name does not necessarily correspond to a single friend. Since the roster includes just a small sample of potential friend names, a respondent who affirms a particular outgroup name on the roster is likely to also have addition outgroup friends whose names were not included. Thus, we cannot use the roster to quantify the impact of making an additional outgroup friend; the position and name generators, discussed below, are better equipped for this purpose.

Table 1: Main models for giving assistance

Dependent Variables:	gave any help	provisions	personal help	rescue
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
outgroup names	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.003*** (0.001)
ingroup names	-0.01*** (0.004)	-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
eth = Croat	0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
eth = Serb	-0.01 (0.05)	0.004 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.02)
age = 12-17	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.01)
age = 18-29	-0.008 (0.02)	0.009 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.01)
age = 50-69	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.02)
female	-0.03** (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.008)
married	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)
household size	0.003 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.0006 (0.003)
residence = Apartment	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04** (0.02)
residence = Other	-0.03 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)	0.10 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)
residence = Village	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.005 (0.009)
territory = outgroup	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.008 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)
territory = unknown	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
exogamy acceptance	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.009)	0.04*** (0.009)	0.02*** (0.004)
wwii helping	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)
yugoslav = Somewhat	0.03* (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
yugoslav = Very	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.0001 (0.02)
risk tolerance	0.007* (0.004)	0.005* (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Controls: BFI traits	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls: Demand	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed-effects				
municipality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	2,465	2,438	2,465	2,465

Clustered (municipality) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table 2: Main models for receiving assistance

Dependent Variables:	received any help	provisions	personal help	rescue
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
outgroup names	0.008*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
ingroup names	-0.008*** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.001)
eth = Croat	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.0009 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)
eth = Serb	-0.006 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
age = 12-17	0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.006 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)
age = 18-29	-0.003 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.008 (0.006)
age = 50-69	-0.04* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
female	0.007 (0.01)	0.01 (0.009)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.007)
married	0.02 (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)	-0.007 (0.01)	0.02* (0.008)
household size	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.0006 (0.002)
residence = Apartment	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.005 (0.01)
residence = Other	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)
residence = Village	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.008 (0.005)
territory = outgroup	0.11*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
territory = unknown	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.006 (0.03)	-0.009 (0.03)
threats = Yes	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
threats = Unknown	-0.009 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
fled	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
demand	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.010)	0.007 (0.005)
yugoslav = Somewhat	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.009)	0.02** (0.007)
yugoslav = Very	0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.007)
finances = Comfortable	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.0004 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.008)
finances = Difficult	0.006 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.007 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
exogamy acceptance	0.03*** (0.007)	0.02*** (0.007)	0.01** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)
wwii helping	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.010 (0.007)
risk tolerance	0.003 (0.003)	0.0008 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.0008 (0.002)
Controls: BFI traits	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed-effects				
municipality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	2,465	2,438	2,465	2,465

Clustered (municipality) standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

The control variables generally behave as expected.[12] Older individuals were no less likely to share their *provisions* but appear to have had a more limited ability to provide *personal help* and *rescue*. Similarly, it may have been more difficult or dangerous for women to physically rescue someone from an arrest or attack. Upbringing also seems to have played a role. Individuals from communities where exogamy was accepted and where stories of different ethnic groups helping each other during WWII circulated were more likely to provide assistance, as were those from families that instilled a strong sense of Yugoslav identity. Urban apartment buildings, which by law were ethnically mixed, appear to have facilitated assistance, at least compared to villages which were more likely to be monoethnic or segregated ("house in a city" is the omitted category). Higher risk tolerance is also associated with giving assistance. Interestingly, additional ingroup ties appear to be negatively correlated with outgroup assistance. This not merely a matter of substituting ingroup friends for outgroup ones—the relationship is negative even when the number of outgroup ties is held constant. However, it may indicate that the ratio of ingroup-to-outgroup ties is important. Individuals with a higher proportion of outgroup ties may have been more likely to have someone from the outgroup close at hand in a moment of need.

Table 2 tells a similar story for those who received help. Outgroup ties, as measured by outgroup names on the identity roster, are positively associated with outgroup assistance. The finding loses significance in model 4, but this may be due to having very few positive cases.[13] Ingroup ties are again negatively associated with outgroup assistance. Individuals with more ingroup ties (or a higher ingroup-to-outgroup ratio) may have been more likely to turn to members of their own group for help, as Finkel (2017) finds in Jewish ghettos during the Holocaust. Children seem to have been more likely to receive assistance. Individuals who were living in territory controlled by an outgroup at the start of the war or fled to another area were more likely to get assistance, likely because they were the ones who needed it. Receiving *threats* is associated with *rescue*, while *demand*, which includes needing provisions, documents, medical assistance, is correlated with provisions and personal help. Exogamy acceptance and stories of help during WWII are once again associated with helping.

The results hold for alternate measures of cross-cleavage ties derived from the name generator and position generator questions (see Figure 4). The first row shows the effect of an additional nearest neighbor, among the three nearest neighbors, being a member of the outgroup. The second row shows the effect of an additional outgroup close friend, among the respondent's two closest friends. The third row shows the effect of an additional outgroup alter among the position generator relationships (spouse, godparent, best man or

[12] Personality traits measured in the BFI-2-S test and variables measuring the respondent's own demand for assistance are omitted for brevity.

[13] Rescue was the rarest category of assistance for both givers and receivers, and it seems likely that those who faced such dire conditions were more likely to emigrate.



Figure 4: Effect of cross-cleavage ties, as measured by name and position generators, on outgroup assistance. Each tie type is run in a separate model (with controls). Position generator variable includes spouse, godparent, and best man/woman. First panel includes all types of assistance; subsequent panels are broken out by category. Inner bars are 90% confidence intervals; outer bars 95%. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

woman at wedding). In each case, I control for the total number of names provided (in case, for example a respondent was unmarried or only gave names for two neighbors instead of three). All three measures are associated with providing assistance, and the results generally hold across categories. Unsurprisingly, neighbors are more likely to be associated with sharing provisions due to their proximity. Results for receiving assistance are similar, though less likely to be significant when broken down into categories. All types are significant for rescue, however. Note that in Figure 4, I have set the scale to percentage points for ease of interpretation. For instance, an additional nearest neighbor from the outgroup is associated with being 5.2 percentage points more likely to provide assistance.

4.3 Tie Strength and Assistance

To test the effects of tie strength on assistance, I rerun the identity-roster-based models from the previous subsection with three categories of outgroup ties—strong ties, medium ties, and weak ties—replacing the *outgroup names* variable. I also replace *ingroup names* with three levels of tie strength as a control. The results are plotted in Figure 5. Contrary to H2, I find that providing assistance to members of the outgroup does not appear to be increasing with tie strength. The number of *medium* cross-cleavage ties appears to have a slightly stronger correlation with assistance than weak ones, though the confidence intervals overlap. The number of strong cross-cleavage ties, in contrast, is not predictive of assistance when accounting for the number of medium and weak ties. Granted, respondents report fewer strong ties than medium or weak



Figure 5: Effect of outgroup weak, medium, and strong ties (as measured by the identity roster) on outgroup assistance. Each model includes all three tie types simultaneously. First panel includes all types of assistance; subsequent panels are broken out by category. Inner bars are 90% confidence intervals; outer bars 95%. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

ones, but the 90% and 95% confidence intervals suggest that even the upper bound of this estimate is likely no higher than the estimate for medium ties. The story is fairly consistent across categories of assistance. That is, we do not find that easy forms of assistance can come from anybody while the most dangerous and costly types come only from close friends and relatives. The relationship for receiving assistance is less straightforward. Assistance does appear to be increasing with tie strength, though the confidence intervals for weak, medium, and strong heavily overlap. There are also fewer positive cases to support our estimates, particularly in the rescue category, which may be causing greater imprecision.

While these findings for giving and receiving help appear to be in tension, it is worth bearing in mind that ties need not be symmetric: one person may consider someone a friend while the other considers them an acquaintance. They may feel differently about the relationship, or they may have different thresholds for their definition of "friend." Moreover, it is plausible that recipients would retroactively classify a relationship they had with a helper as friendship, even if at the time both considered each other to be acquaintances. Finally, just because strong ties make one more likely to receive assistance does not mean that assistance had to come through a strong tie. Persecutees with many strong ties may have felt more inclined to trust any outgroup member they knew, regardless of tie strength. Conversely, helpers with more ties of both types may have felt more compelled to do something to help, but then sought out those they cared about most to offer assistance to. In order to assess which of these four explanations seems most likely, let us ask the helpers and recipients themselves whom they got help from or gave help to.

The importance of weak ties is reflected in my interviews and in those previously collected by other scholars. Consider the following quote from Amer, a Muslim man caught in a roundup of Muslims in the Grbavica neighborhood of Sarajevo, which had just fallen to Serb militia:

> My neighbor took me out of that group so they don't take me somewhere. Because they were separating [Muslims] for the concentration camp in Lukavica. Before the war we never even had a coffee. Yeah, we greeted each other just out of politeness. I didn't even know his name!

Or this quote from Jovana, a Serb woman in Banja Luka who helped out one of her Muslim acquaintances:

> I was taking care of my neighbor's children. Two girls. They lived with me, yeah. They were high school students. Their parents were there but they were afraid for them. And so they slept [in my house] because we were neighbors. Their parents and I worked together. We weren't really [close] but we knew each other. I worked in [sales] and they worked in production. They were there for a month.

In both these cases, we observe weak ties providing crucial assistance, in Amer's case from the recipient's point of view, in Jovana's case, from the helper's. That said, these ties are weak in the sense of affect, not the frequency of interactions. In both cases, but particularly in Jovana's case, the helper and recipient(s) saw each other on a regular basis, thus increasing the chances they would be aware of one another's need for assistance and capacity/willingness to provide it. Amer surely had stronger ties elsewhere in the community, but they did not have timely information about his plight and, thus, were not in a position to provide assistance, if they were even able. In nearly all of my interviews, I explicitly asked how close the helper and recipient were and found that they were acquaintances or normal friends much more often than close friends. Rarely, however, did I hear of instances of complete strangers with whom no network connection existed.

In sum, we have overwhelming evidence to suggest that weak outgroup ties are capable of channeling assistance and that those who have more of them are more likely to provide it. This does not, however, confirm Granovetter (1973)'s "strength of weak ties" theory, which argues that weak ties are *more* effective than strong ones at passing along new information and opportunities. There is no evidence here to suggest that weak ties have some special property that makes them more effective. In fact, as Centola and Macy (2007) state in their abstract, "The strength of weak ties is that they tend to be long—they connect socially distant locations." Cross-cleavage ties are often already "long" in this sense, particularly in Bosnia given the ethnic homophily seen in friendships, marriages, and residential patterns. Thus, for any tie, conditional on it being cross-group, weakness probably does not confer any additional benefits. This finding may extend to other contexts, well beyond Bosnia and civil war. Strong ties may make people more likely to *receive* assistance, but the data is too noisy to be confident that this finding will hold up to further scrutiny.

Finally, with so many cases of help coming from strong and weak ties alike, we might start to wonder whether these friends and acquaintances were responsible for any of the violence. While most interviewees did not tell me stories of someone they knew physically attacking them, such incidents did occur. Far more common, however, were what we might regard as "sins of omission" in which a neighbor or friend failed to warn the interviewee of an oncoming attack. There were also cases of opportunistic crimes such as seizing victims' property. Rarely were these acts committed by someone who the victim considered close; betrayal was far more common in weak ties. Thus, it is important not to overemphasize the benefits of weak cross-cleavage ties. Connections without emotional depth may suffice to channel assistance, but they may also be too weak to deter acts of harm, whether due to personal temptation, peer pressure, or coercion by armed actors.

5 Conclusion

Despite widespread group-targeted violence including rape, looting, massacres, territorial cleansing, and concentration camps, a substantial portion of Bosnians of all ethnic groups continued to act on their cross-group relationships throughout the war. Those who were threatened sought help from those they knew, while those who were in a position to help offered what they could to their relatives, friends, colleagues and acquaintances. As a result, cross-group assistance was widespread, with about a quarter of Bosnians giving or receiving help from a member of the outgroup. Help could come through strong ties as well as weak ones or even higher-order alters whom the recipient did not know but was connected to through other helpers. Individuals whose ties to the outgroup tended to be stronger were no more likely to help than those with weaker ties. Although we might expect war to "prune" social networks, stripping away all but the strongest cross-cleavage ties, weak ties continued to contribute to persecutees' cross-cleavage capital once the violence began.

In addition to documenting the ways in which networks mobilize cross-group assistance, this study serves as an invitation to scholars to investigate cleavage-defying behaviors more broadly. Although political scientists such as Mueller (2000) and King (2001) have long questioned whether so-called "ethnic" wars are really so different from non-ethnic ones, researchers have yet to investigate the full scope of behaviors through which individuals break out of that ethnic paradigm. Wood (2003) examines cleavage-defying behaviors in a conflict where the boundary is defined by class, but scholars have yet to connect her work to the literature on ethnic defection. In drawing attention to the myriad ways by which people defy the master cleavage of a civil war, I hope to encourage other researchers to look at ethnic defection, cross-group assistance, and so-called peace communities (Kaplan 2017) as part of a common framework of cleavage-defying behavior.

Those who study civil wars, mass movements, repressive regimes, or ethnic and class divisions have much to gain from trying to understand why people break ranks with their group and what sorts of social structures make them more likely to do so.

Though it is tempting to take the results of this study as evidence for the efficacy of policies bringing together people of different groups, one needs to be cautious in doing so. Ethnic groups' claims to legitimacy over a given territory are often driven by settlement patterns (Toft 2010), which residential integration can undermine. As Woodward (1995) documents, Croat and Serb nationalists saw Bosnia's mixed communities as an obstacle to their aims of partition and thus embarked on a savage campaign of rape, torture, and massacres in order to achieve what Toal and Dahlman (2011) dub the "unmixing" of Bosnia. As a result, the war in Bosnia was primarily one of territorial cleansing in which ethnic extremists concentrated violence in areas that were highly mixed. Therefore, any policy-maker seeking to foster cross-group harmony through networks needs to think carefully before promoting residential integration as a means to achieve it. The same mixed residential patterns that give rise to cross-ethnic assistance during conflict through neighborhood networks can also attract violence entrepreneurs like a magnet if such mixing stands in the ways of their strategic or ideological aims. Nevertheless, if a community is already mixed, then promoting cross-cleavage ties may be a good way to mitigate violence. Moreover, studying the pathways through which networks promote cross-group assistance can open the door to more nuanced policies. The non-effect of tie strength, for instance, suggests that peacebuilding funds might be best spent on programs that aim to foster weak ties between a large number of people rather than strong ties between a few. However, before these findings can be applied, further research is needed on the flip side of assistance—betrayal—to make sure promoting weak cross-cleavage ties does not generate more harm than good.

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